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INTRODUCTION
According to Greek mythology, King Gordius secured a ceremonial
wagon with a knot so perplexing that the Delphic Oracle prophesized
that the person who untied the knot would be crowned king of
1
2
Phrygia and rule Asia. The knot was never untied. The Supreme

∗

J.D., 2002, magna cum laude, American University, Washington College of Law;
Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 51; B.A., 1995, The University of
Texas at Austin. I would like to thank Russell Wheeler and Sheryl Dickey for their
insightful comments and critique. This casenote is dedicated to Charles M. Johnson
and would not have been possible without the loving support of my family and my
wife—ma plouc.
1. 7 PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES 272-73 (Bernadotte Perrin trans. & G.P. Gould

1051

JOHNSON.PRINTER.DOC

1052

7/26/2002 12:55 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 1051

Court, like a modern King Gordius, has secured the Eleventh
Amendment, which defines the boundary between federal judicial
3
power and state sovereignty, with a jurisprudential knot that is
4
equally complex and confusing. The conflicting, inconsistent, and
contrived rationales delineating the contours of this Eleventh
Amendment Gordian knot often obscure rather than illuminate the
5
boundaries the Eleventh Amendment seeks to define. With the
6
decision in Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia,
the Court passed on an opportunity to loosen a strand of its own
Gordian knot.
The question presented in Lapides asked whether a state waives
Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily removing a case to
7
federal court. In answering this question in the affirmative, the
Supreme Court determined that removal constitutes a voluntary
8
invocation of federal jurisdiction. This Note, however, asserts the
Court in Lapides should have broadened the analysis to resolve the
underlying inconsistency that rests Eleventh Amendment waiver on
both the federal court’s personal and subject matter jurisdiction

ed., Harvard University Press 1999) (1919) (providing the original Greek text with
English translation); PIERRE GRIMAL, THE DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 173
(A.R. Maxwell-Hyslop trans., Blackwell Publishers 1986) (1951); JENNY MARCH,
CASSELL DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 336 (2001).
2. PLUTARCH, supra note 1, at 271-73. Of course, mythology famously accredits
Alexander the Great with severing the Gordian Knot with a sword stroke. However,
Plutarch notes differing accounts, which state Alexander simply removed the pin that
fastened the yoke to the knot. Id.
3. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 669-70 (1999) (noting the Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional bar has been
consistently interpreted in the last century as prohibiting suits in federal court
against un-consenting states); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)
(same); Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 283 (1906) (same).
4. See discussion infra Part I.A-B, II.A-C.
5. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.1 (3d ed. 1999)
(noting that the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment case law has been described
as “tortuous” and “hodgepodge”); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather
than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1983) (“The
eleventh amendment is one of the Constitution’s most baffling provisions . . . .”);
Note, Reconceptualizing the Role of Constructive Waiver After Seminole, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1759, 1759 (1999) (“If consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, the Supreme
Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is surely the product of great ones.”).
6. No. 01-298, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *6 (U.S. May 13, 2002).
7. Id. at *11; see also Brief for Petitioner at i, Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 122 S. Ct. 456 (2001) (No. 01-298); Brief for Respondents at i,
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 122 S. Ct. 456 (2001) (No. 01-298).
8. Lapides, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *17 (noting the Court’s current Eleventh
Amendment waiver rules distinguish between states voluntarily and involuntarily in
federal court); see discussion infra Part II.A-B. See generally Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (stating that Eleventh Amendment immunity may
be waived when a state voluntarily invokes federal court jurisdiction).

JOHNSON.PRINTER.DOC

7/26/2002 12:55 PM

2002]

LAPIDES V. BOARD OF REGENTS

1053

9

determinations. By declining to address this inconsistency, the
Court’s decision in Lapides is unnecessarily narrow and fails to clarify
the Eleventh Amendment’s unique jurisdictional bar.
The discussion is divided into three parts. Part I briefly reviews the
Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and provides
an overview of Lapides. Part II analyzes the Court’s Eleventh
Amendment waiver jurisprudence and the Court’s holding in Lapides
that voluntary removal to federal court constituted an explicit waiver
of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Framed by this analysis, Part II
argues that the Court’s inconsistent treatment of the Eleventh
Amendment as a restriction on subject matter jurisdiction represents
the source of the confusion in Lapides. Part III argues that, to resolve
this inconsistency, the Court should conform Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, within the context of removal, to the requirements of
personal jurisdiction.
I.

BACKGROUND: TYING THE KNOT

A. Basic Principles of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Although a detailed review of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence lies well beyond the scope of this Note, coherency
10
demands a brief review. Article III of the Constitution invests the
11
federal courts with federal judicial power and defines the types of
12
cases and controversies that fall within this judicial power.
Following the Constitutional Convention, delegates to the state
ratification conventions inconclusively debated the extent of Article
13
14
III’s effect on state sovereign immunity. With Chisholm v.Georgia,

9. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the aspects of personal jurisdiction
and subject matter jurisdiction that are found in Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.3 (noting that permitting
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity runs counter to the well-established
principles of subject matter jurisdiction, which reiterate that parties cannot agree to
federal court jurisdiction).
10. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-25-27 (3d
ed. 2000) (providing an excellent summary of the Supreme Court’s Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence).
11. See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”).
12. Id. § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. As ratified in 1787, Article III
contained two clauses that extended judicial power to controversies “between a State
and Citizens of another State . . . and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and
foreign . . . Citizens,” both which arguably permitted states to be sued in federal
court. Id.
13. Compare CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 27-40 (1972) (noting that Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Virginia, New York,
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the Supreme Court resolved that debate by finding that the
15
state-citizen diversity clause of Article III subjected states to federal
16
court jurisdiction. This decision led to the adoption of the Eleventh
17
Amendment, which states: “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
18
State.”
The Supreme Court’s early jurisprudence interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment as protecting states only from suits by citizens of other
19
20
states. The Court’s seminal decision in Hans v. Louisiana, however,
extended the Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional bar to suits by in21
state plaintiffs, thereby prohibiting all suits against non-consenting

North Carolina and Rhode Island debated, with differing levels of rigour, the effect
of Article III upon state sovereignty, and concluding that those states failed to reach
a definitive determination regarding whether state sovereign immunity survived
Article III), with Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C.L. REV.
485, 493-98 (2001) (concluding that the state ratification debates demonstrate that
the states assumed they had retained sovereignty and arguing that the passage of the
Eleventh Amendment confirmed this assumption). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429-51 (1987) (discussing the
competing theories of English and Colonial-American “governmental” sovereign
immunity contemporary with the drafting of the Constitution); JACOBS, supra, at 3-74
(discussing the doctrine of state sovereign immunity before the Constitution’s
ratification).
14. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
15. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . .”).
16. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451, 466, 469, 479 (pinpointing the seriatim
opinions of Justices Blair, Wilson, Cushing and Chief Justice Jay). But see id. at 434-36
(Iredell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Judiciary Act of 1789 implicitly incorporated
the common-law principles of sovereign immunity and therefore barred the Court’s
jurisdiction because those principles were not explicitly altered by the Judiciary Act
of 1789). Justice Iredell refused to reach the Article III question. Id. at 450.
17. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 669 (1999) (stating “[t]he ‘shock of surprise’ created by this decision, prompted
the immediate adoption of the Eleventh Amendment . . . .”) (quoting Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934)) (citation omitted). See generally
William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to
Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1268-71 (1989) (detailing the drafting process that
culminated in Congress approving an amendment in early 1794 that was ratified as
the Eleventh Amendment in 1795).
Representative Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts proposed an amendment barring states from being sued in federal
court the day after Chisholm was announced. Id. at 1269.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
19. See, e.g., Cohnes v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment inapplicable because the state and one of its own citizens were
adverse parties and thus the controversy fell outside the language of the Eleventh
Amendment). See generally JACOBS, supra note 13, at 75-105 (surveying the early
Eleventh Amendment cases and concluding that the Court’s strict textual
interpretation limited the Eleventh Amendment’s scope).
20. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
21. Id. at 20-21.
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23

The Hans Court justified its atextual interpretation and
states.
departure from its own precedent by reasoning the Eleventh
Amendment embodied deeply rooted principles of state sovereign
24
immunity.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hans established a broad
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Although the Court has created
25
exceptions to this immunity, the Court’s modern jurisprudence
continues to affirm the jurisdictional bar erected by Hans and its
26
27
underlying rationale. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, which held that

22. Id.; see, e.g., Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973) (acknowledging that although the
Eleventh Amendment on its face does not bar suits by in-state plaintiffs, the current
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence holds that “an unconsenting State is immune
from suit brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of
another State”).
23. See generally John Randolph Prince, Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing the Tune:
The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity, 104 DICK. L. REV. 1, 38 (1999) (arguing
that because the suit in Hans claimed Louisiana violated the Constitution’s Contract
Clause, the Court’s departure from the Eleventh Amendment’s text in Hans
necessarily led to the creation of a “parallel Eleventh Amendment” that also barred
federal question suits against states).
24. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-11, 15-16 (noting that prohibiting suits against states
by citizens of another state, yet permitting suits by citizens of the same state, would
be an “anomalous result” and further asserting that suing an unconsenting State “was
a thing unknown to the law”).
25. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that
Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity only under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and not under its general Article I legislative powers); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (holding the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar injunctive relief from state officials who engage in unconstitutional conduct);
see also discussion infra Part II (discussing wavier of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
26. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47, 69 (1996) (mimicking the hyperbolic prose
of Hans in stating that the decision drew not only from English common law notions
of sovereign immunity but also from “the much more fundamental ‘jurisprudence in
all civilized nations’”); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23
(1934) (asserting that the states retain “attributes of sovereignty” that survived the
ratification of Article III of the Constitution and were not limited by the text of the
Eleventh Amendment); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1921) (stating that
a state’s sovereignty is a “fundamental rule of jurisprudence,” which the Eleventh
Amendment partially embodies). See generally Hill, supra note 13, at 517-20
(acknowledging the “overwhelmingly negative” academic response to Hans, while
arguing that Hans reflected the original pre-constitutional understanding of state
sovereign immunity). But see THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1525-26 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds.,
1996) (recognizing that the economic reality of post-Reconstruction America, where
numerous states were burdened by tremendous Civil War era debt, required the
Supreme Court to hold that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited both suits by instate and out-of-state plaintiffs in order to prevent open rebellion by debt-burdened
states); Prince, supra note 23, at 37-41 (arguing that the decision in Hans was rooted
in the Court’s “acontextual” reading of the Eleventh Amendment and the Court’s
overly broad Contract Clause jurisprudence); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity; A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889,
1998-2002 (1983) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Hans stemmed from a
politically astute choice to avoid open conflict with the states on the issue of
repayment of Civil War era debt).
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Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity only under
28
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cited one
29
hundred years of case law affirming Hans.
Moreover, the Court
explicitly reaffirmed its atextual Eleventh Amendment interpretation
by stating “blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment
is ‘to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
30
imagined or dreamed of.’”
In holding that Congress may not
abrogate sovereign immunity in state courts under Article I, the
31
Court in Alden v. Maine cited Hans to again emphasize its rejection
32
of a strict adherence to the Eleventh Amendment’s text. Therefore,
despite over one hundred years of subsequent case law, Hans remains
the touchstone of any Eleventh Amendment analysis and the source
of the Eleventh Amendment’s constitutional bar to federal
33
jurisdiction.
B. An Overview of Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia
Kennesay State University Professor Paul Lapides sued the
University Board of Regents in Georgia state court for damages
34
arising from sexual harassment accusations.
Georgia’s Attorney
General removed the case to federal district court and claimed
35
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The district court held that
Georgia waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing the case
36
37
to federal court. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for

27. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
28. Id. at 72-73.
29. Id. at 54 n.7 (collecting cases).
30. Id. at 69 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).
31. 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
32. See id. at 728-29 (stating that the Court’s Eleventh Amendment case law
subsequent to its decision in Hans demonstrates that the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity rests not only upon the Eleventh Amendment but also upon
extra-Constitutional principles of sovereign immunity).
33. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 01-298, 2002 U.S.
LEXIS 3220, at *10 (U.S. May 13, 2002) (citing the text of the Eleventh Amendment
as interpreted by Hans as defining the scope of state sovereign immunity); Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64-65, 69-70 (stating the decisions since Hans have consistently
affirmed that the Eleventh Amendment limits federal jurisdiction through the
incorporation of the principle of state sovereign immunity); see also sources cited
supra note 26.
34. See Lapides, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *6-7 (suing under Georgia state tort law
and Section 1983).
35. Id. at *7; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2002) (authorizing the removal of cases
from state to federal court).
36. Lapides, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *7. The U.S. District Court’s opinion is
unreported.
37. See generally R.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139,
141 (1993) (holding a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity may be immediately
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the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that, absent explicit statutory
or constitutional waiver authorization, removal to federal court does
38
not constitute waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. In dicta,
the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that its holding allows a state to
invoke federal jurisdiction and yet “simultaneously argu[e] with equal
39
force” that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction. This
40
“seemingly inconsistent position” prompted the Eleventh Circuit to
note Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Wisconsin Department of
41
Corrections v. Schacht. There, Justice Kennedy theorized that a waiverby-removal rule would place states on notice that officials authorized
to represent the state could waive immunity and thereby render the
42
requirement of explicit authorization to remove irrelevant.
The
43
Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt Justice Kennedy’s reasoning.
However, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the
Eleventh Circuit, and held that removal from state to federal court
44
waives Eleventh Amendment immunity.
II. ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING THE TWISTS
A. Eleventh Amendment Waiver Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has consistently held that Eleventh
45
Amendment sovereign immunity is not absolute.
The Court’s

appealed).
38. Lapides, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *8; see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 251 F.3d 1372, 1374-77 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that the attorney
general lacks any explicit constitutional or statutory authorization to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,
467-69 (1945)), rev’d, No. 01-298, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *1 (U.S. May 13, 2002).
39. Lapides, 251 F.3d at 1377; see also Calderon v. Ashums, 523 U.S. 740, 645 n.2
(1998) (noting that Eleventh Amendment immunity may be asserted for the first
time on appeal after the State has defended on the merits). See generally discussion
infra Part II.C.
40. Lapides, 251 F.3d at 1377.
41. 524 U.S. 381 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 393-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the “hybrid nature” of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, which shares both characteristics of personal and
subject matter jurisdiction, creates an inconsistency that unfairly allows states to
claim immunity after litigating on the merits). The holding in Schacht states that the
presence of Eleventh Amendment barred claims “does not destroy removal
jurisdiction.” Id. at 386; see also discussion infra Part II.
43. Lapides, 251 F.3d at 1377 (noting that the court is bound only by the
majority’s opinion in Schacht). But see, e.g., Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf &
Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1233-36 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the state’s affirmative
conduct in removing to federal court in holding that removal constitutes waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
44. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 01-298, 2002 U.S.
LEXIS 3220, at *20-21 (U.S. May 13, 2002).
45. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (stating
that a state must expressly agree to be sued in “federal court” in order for there to be a
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current jurisprudence recognizes two circumstances in which a state
46
loses Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, Congress may override
47
immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, a state may waive immunity by consenting to be sued in
48
federal court. Although the Court once recognized the doctrine of
49
constructive waiver, the Court presently only finds waiver when a
state statutorily or constitutionally expresses “unequivocally that it
50
waives its immunity . . . .”
Embedded within this waiver jurisprudence are two further
elements relevant to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lapides. First, in
51
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, the Supreme Court
held that the power to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity will not
be imputed to state officers in individual cases against a state without
52
“clear [statutory] language to the contrary.” Second, a state waives

waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447
(1883) (noting that the Constitution implicitly recognizes a state’s sovereign
immunity, which a state “may waive at pleasure”).
46. See generally TRIBE, supra note 10, § 3.26 (surveying the Court’s abrogation and
waiver jurisprudence). The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Lapides rested on an
analysis of the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment waiver jurisprudence. See
Lapides, 251 F.3d at 1374-76 (noting that the test to determine whether a state has
waived Eleventh Amendment immunity “is a stringent one” that requires clear
explicit language or intent to effectuate) (citing Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at
241; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). “[A] waiver of Eleventh
Amendment Immunity by state officials must be explicitly authorized by the
state . . . .” Id. at 1367.
47. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (reasoning that because the
Fourteenth Amendment embodies “limitations on state authority” and was drafted
specifically to alter the state-federal balance, Congress possesses the authority under
Section 5 to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Article I). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.7
(discussing the Supreme Court’s congressional abrogation case law and noting that
the point of analysis following Seminole Tribe is determining whether Congress
enacted a given statute under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
48. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 670 (1999) (stating Eleventh Amendment immunity may be waived); Wisconsin
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (same).
49. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190-96 (1964) (holding that
despite the state’s denial of federal court jurisdiction, the state nonetheless
constructively waived immunity by operating an interstate railroad following the
enactment of a federal statute that authorized suits against states in federal court),
overruled by Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680 (“We think that the constructive-waiver
experiment of Parden was ill-conceived, and . . . [w]hatever may remain of our
decision in Parden is expressly overruled.”).
50. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680.
51. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
52. See id. at 468 (holding that a statute granting the state’s attorney general the
power to defend suits against the state cannot also be construed to empower the
attorney general with the authority to waive immunity on behalf of a non-consenting
state). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Seventh Circuit
incorrectly applied Indiana state law. However, due to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the Court never reached the merits of the case. Id. at 462.
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immunity by voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction. Relying on
Ford Motor Co., the Eleventh Circuit determined that neither
Georgia’s constitution nor relevant Georgia statutes contained
sufficiently clear language authorizing Georgia’s Attorney General to
54
waive the state’s sovereign immunity.
B. The Lapides Decision: Voluntary Removal Constitutes Waiver of
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis,
finding that its reliance on Ford Motor Co. was misplaced. Unlike the
defendant state in Ford Motor Co., Georgia, faced with a suit in its own
55
courts in Lapides, affirmatively chose a federal forum by its voluntary
56
removal to federal district court. Under the removal statute and
relevant case law, removal requires both that the federal district court
57
have original jurisdiction over the case, and that all the defendants
58
must consent to removal. Moreover, once the removal petition is
59
filed, the state court ceases to exercise jurisdiction. In Lapides, the
federal district court exercised jurisdiction based on the federal

53. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675; Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S.
273, 284-85 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
54. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 251 F.3d 1372, 1375 (11th Cir.
2001), rev’d, No. 01-298, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *1 (U.S. May 13, 2002). However,
the court did note that the state attorney general was authorized to “represent the
state in all civil actions tried in any court.” Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 45-15-3(6)
(2001)). In dicta, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that removal does not invoke
federal jurisdiction because the state did not “initiate [the] cause of action.” Id. at
1378.
55. Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 141 F.2d 24, 24 (1944), vacated,
Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 470 (“The plaintiff . . . brought suit in the District
Court . . . .”), with Lapides, 251 F.3d at 1373 (“Lapides sued . . . in the Superior Court
Cobb County, Georgia . . . .”).
56. Lapides, 251 F.3d at 1373. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2002) (stating the
procedure for removal); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 5.5 (summarizing federal court
removal jurisdiction).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2002) (stating that “any civil action brought in State
Court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may
be removed . . . .”). Original jurisdiction in the federal courts may be based on
either federal-question jurisdiction, id. § 1331, or diversity jurisdiction, id. § 1332.
The removal statute does not create an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
See Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1998) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §1441(a)
to state that cases may be removed from state court only when the case could have
been originally filed in federal court).
58. See, e.g., Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900)
(stating axiomatically that “it was well settled that a removal could not be effected
unless all the parties on the same side of the controversy united in the petition”); see
also Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating simply that “[r]emoval requires the consent of all of the
defendants”).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2002) (stating that after the defendant notifies all
relevant parties and the state court, “the State court shall proceed no further unless
and until the case is remanded.”).
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question present in the section 1983 claims, and Georgia filed the
61
removal petition on behalf of all the consenting defendants.
In Ford Motor Co., the central presumption was that the defendant
62
state did not explicitly consent to federal jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. required explicit state
authorization permitting state officers to waive immunity before
rebutting the presumption that the state did not consent to “federal
63
judicial power.” Given that Georgia voluntarily removed to federal
court in Lapides, the Eleventh Circuit could not properly presume
64
that Georgia refused to consent to federal court jurisdiction.
Without the benefit of Ford Motor Co.’s central presumption, the
Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Ford Motor Co.’s requirement of explicit
65
authorization emerged as misplaced.
Consequently, the Georgia
Attorney General’s lack of explicit waiver authority became irrelevant
when weighed against Georgia’s voluntary consent to and invocation
66
of federal jurisdiction through its removing to federal district court.
This voluntary consent constituted waiver of Eleventh Amendment
67
immunity.
However, as the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted, Eleventh
68
Amendment immunity may be asserted for the first time on appeal,
which allows states to litigate on the merits and to subsequently have
adverse judgments vacated through assertion of Eleventh

60. But see Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 01-298, 2002
U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *8-9 (U.S. May 13, 2002) (noting that because states are not
“persons” under § 1983 claims, no federal question existed, yet finding the question
in Lapides was not moot due to the state-law tort claims pending in federal district
court). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 5.1 (stating that the two most
important elements of federal subject matter jurisdiction are federal question
jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction).
61. Lapides, 251 F.3d at 1373.
62. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (noting
that whether Indiana consented to be sued had yet to be decided). Although
Indiana belatedly asserted immunity, the Supreme Court deemed the Eleventh
Amendment’s “explicit limitation on federal judicial power” sufficiently compelling
to permit immunity to be raised on appeal. Id. at 467.
63. Id. at 467-68.
64. Supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
65. Lapides, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *16-19.
66. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 675-76 (1999) (declaring Eleventh Amendment immunity will be waived “if
the State voluntarily invokes [federal court] jurisdiction”).
67. See Lapides, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *20-21; supra notes 48, 50-53 and
accompanying text.
68. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 251 F.3d 1372, 1378 (11th
Cir. 2001) (noting that “previous cases have held that the Eleventh Amendment
immunity may be asserted at any point in a case”), rev’d, No. 01-298, 2002 U.S. LEXIS
3220, at *1 (U.S. May 13, 2002); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78
(1974) (citing Ford Motor Co. and noting that Eleventh Amendment immunity need
not be raised at trial in order to preserve the defense on appeal).
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69

Amendment immunity on appeal. This inequitable situation arises
from one of the inconsistent jurisprudential twists within the
Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment Gordian knot and represents
the source of the issue presented in Lapides.
C. Resting between Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction
To properly adjudicate a case, the federal courts must exercise
both subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and personal
70
jurisdiction over the parties. Subject matter jurisdiction limits the
71
types of cases the federal courts may hear and cannot be consented
72
to or waived. In contrast, personal jurisdiction restricts the power of
73
the federal courts over parties and can be consented to or waived.
The split nature of the Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional
restrictions represents the unstable foundation upon which the
74
waiver-by-removal rule set forth in Lapides rests. The Supreme Court
interprets the Eleventh Amendment as embodying the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which restricts federal subject matter jurisdiction
75
by prohibiting suits in federal court against non-consenting states.
Underscoring the assumption that Eleventh Amendment immunity
76
rests on subject matter jurisdiction, the Court allows an immunity

69. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (outlining the “hybrid nature” of the Eleventh Amendment that allows a
state “to proceed to judgment without facing any real risk of adverse consequences”);
Oliver B. Rutherford, Note, Don’t Waive the White Flag Just Yet: Justice Kennedy’s
Concurring Opinion in Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht Breathes Life
into Eleventh Amendment Waiver, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 581, 594-95 (2000) (noting that the
current Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar potentially places plaintiffs in a “nowin situation” because if the state loses at trial, the state may assert immunity on
appeal or if the state wins at trial, the state benefits from res judicata).
70. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxities de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
701 (1982) (stating that “[t]he validity of an order of a federal court depends upon
that court’s having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties”) .
71. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 5.1 (outlining the basic elements of
subject matter jurisdiction). Those basic elements are: (1) federal courts must have
constitutional and statutory authority to hear the case; (2) parties seeking federal
court jurisdiction must demonstrate the existence of that jurisdiction; (3) consent
does not create jurisdiction; (4) federal courts may raise, sua sponte, jurisdictional
defects; (5) state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction; and (6) dismissal destroys
subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
72. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 (noting that “a party does not waive
the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings”).
73. See id. at 703 (noting that an individual may submit to or waive personal
jurisdiction).
74. See, e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text.
75. See discussion supra Part I.A (reviewing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence);
see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (“[W]e reconfirm the
background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment . . . .”).
76. See generally Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 (reviewing the basic tenants of
federal subject matter jurisdiction, which is derived from Article III and federal
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77

claim to be raised at any point in the proceedings.
However, by permitting Eleventh Amendment immunity to be
78
waived, the Court undermines this assumption—and treads into
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence—because waiver or party consent
79
Furthermore, federal
cannot create subject matter jurisdiction.
courts are not required to raise Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional
80
defects sua sponte, contrary to normal subject matter jurisdiction
81
Those characteristics, instead, comport with the
requirements.
82
federal court’s personal jurisdiction requirements, which parties
83
may waive or be estopped from challenging.
The decision in Lapides rests upon the principle that a state waives
Eleventh Amendment immunity when the state voluntarily invokes
84
federal court jurisdiction.
The Court held a state’s removal to
85
federal court is voluntary, and to hold contrary would permit states
to unfairly invoke while simultaneously arguing against federal
86
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, while the holding in Lapides did not
depend on resolving the inconsistent nature of the Eleventh
Amendment’s jurisdictional bar, the Court’s unwillingness to clarify

statutes).
77. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945).
78. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text (providing brief summary of
Eleventh Amendment waiver jurisprudence).
79. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 (“[N]o action of the parties can confer
subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court . . . the consent of the parties is
irrelevant . . . and a party does not waive [subject matter jurisdiction] by failing to
challenge jurisdiction early in the proceeding.”).
80. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 n.19 (1982) (stating federal
courts are not required to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity defects); see also Wis.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Patsy for proposition). But see, e.g., Michelle Lawner, Comment, Why Federal Courts
Should be Required to Consider State Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1261 (1999) (arguing that federal courts should be required to raise Eleventh
Amendment immunity jurisdictional defects sua sponte to prevent states from
gaining unfair advantage).
81. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 (stating that federal trial and appellate
courts must “raise lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion”).
82. See generally id. at 702-03 (reviewing the basic principles of personal
jurisdiction, which are derived from the Due Process Clause).
83. See id. at 704-05 (stating the requirements of personal jurisdiction may be
explicitly waived by the defendant or the defendant’s conduct may be deemed to
have implicitly submitted to federal court jurisdiction thereby creating personal
jurisdiction).
84. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 01-298, 2002 U.S.
LEXIS 3220, at *11-13 (U.S. May 13, 2002) (emphasizing the manifest inequity that
would arise if a state’s voluntary invocation of federal jurisdiction were deemed
insufficient to waive state sovereign immunity).
85. See id. at *14-16 (noting a state’s altruistic motives cannot be evaluated in
determining whether removal was voluntary).
86. See id. at *18 (stating the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment and the states
themselves—to the extent of their consent to federal jurisdiction—cannot be
assumed to have purposefully created unfairness in the federal courts).
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this inconsistency undermines the precedential value of Lapides
within the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
III. RESOLUTION: SHARPENING THE SWORD
Justice Kennedy, who attributed this inconsistency to the “hybrid
nature” of the Eleventh Amendment’s “jurisdictional bar,” offered a
87
possible resolution to this “knot” in a prior concurring opinion. In
Schacht, Justice Kennedy suggested simply conforming Eleventh
Amendment waiver jurisprudence to personal jurisdiction
88
requirements. Thus, once a state voluntarily appeared in federal
court, the state would be estopped from later asserting Eleventh
89
Amendment immunity.
The Court has obliquely signaled that such a proposed resolution
would square with the Court’s current Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence by refusing to recognize the Eleventh Amendment as a
“nonwaivable limit on the federal judiciary’s subject-matter
90
jurisdiction.” The adoption of this proposed modification would
have clarified the jurisdictional nature of the Eleventh Amendment
and tied the Eleventh Amendment’s waiver jurisprudence to the
91
Court’s well developed personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
This
importation of the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence would
have provided a body of sufficiently analogous waiver principles that
lower courts and parties could have relied upon when litigating
matters implicating Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, the
Court in Lapides declined to adopt Justice Kennedy’s proposed
92
modification to Eleventh Amendment waiver jurisprudence.

87. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394-95 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy indicated that when a state appeared in federal court
absent compulsion, he would likely find waiver of immunity. Id. at 395-98.
88. See id. at 395 (stating that “the Court could eliminate unfairness by modifying
. . . Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence to make it more consistent with [the
Court’s] practice regarding personal jurisdiction”).
89. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxities de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
704-05 (1982) (noting that certain conduct in court constitutes “legal submission” to
jurisdiction, despite the party’s intentions to the contrary).
90. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); see also Schacht, 524
U.S. at 391-92 (noting that the Court has not yet determined whether Eleventh
Amendment immunity is to be construed as a “matter of subject matter
jurisdiction”).
91. Supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
92. Compare Schacht, 524 U.S. at 393-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting a
waiver-by-removal rule could rectify the unfairness afforded states by the Eleventh
Amendment by anchoring a waiver-by-removal rule to the Court’s personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence), with Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
No. 01-298, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3220, at *15-16, *18-19 (U.S. May 13, 2002) (citing
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Schacht but declining to discuss Justice Kennedy’s
suggestion to modify the Eleventh Amendment to track personal jurisdiction).

JOHNSON.PRINTER.DOC

1064

7/26/2002 12:55 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 1051

CONCLUSION
Permitting a state to invoke federal jurisdiction to remove a case to
federal court while simultaneously asserting the federal court lacks
jurisdiction afforded states an unfair advantage in federal courts. By
holding that a state that removes to federal court explicitly waives
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Supreme Court rectified that
inequity. However, by declining to tie a waiver-by-removal rule to the
restrictions of personal jurisdiction, the Court left a knot that would
have baffled even Alexander.

